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Abstract
There are many situations where relatives interact while at the same time there is genetic
polymorphism in traits influencing survival and reproduction. Examples include cheater-
cooperator polymorphism and polymorphic microbial pathogens. Environmental heteroge-
neity, favoring different traits in nearby habitats, with dispersal between them, is one general
reason to expect polymorphism. Currently, there is no formal framework of social evolution
that encompasses genetic polymorphism. We develop such a framework, thus integrating
theories of social evolution into the evolutionary ecology of heterogeneous environments.
We allow for adaptively maintained genetic polymorphism by applying the concept of
genetic cues. We analyze a model of social evolution in a two-habitat situation with limited
dispersal between habitats, in which the average relatedness at the time of helping and
other benefits of helping can differ between habitats. An important result from the analysis is
that alleles at a polymorphic locus play the role of genetic cues, in the sense that the pres-
ence of a cue allele contains statistical information for an organism about its current environ-
ment, including information about relatedness. We show that epistatic modifiers of the cue
polymorphism can evolve to make optimal use of the information in the genetic cue, in anal-
ogy with a Bayesian decision maker. Another important result is that the genetic linkage
between a cue locus and modifier loci influences the evolutionary interest of modifiers, with
tighter linkage leading to greater divergence between social traits induced by different cue
alleles, and this can be understood in terms of genetic conflict.
Author Summary
The theory of kin selection explains the evolution of helping when relatives interact. It can
be used when individuals in a social group have different sexes, ages or phenotypic quali-
ties, but the theory has not been worked out for situations where there is genetic polymor-
phism in helping. That kind of polymorphism, for instance cheater-cooperator
polymorphism in microbes, has attracted much interest. We include these phenomena
into a general framework of social evolution. Our framework is built on the idea of genetic
cues, which means that an individual uses its genotype at a polymorphic locus as a
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statistical predictor of the current social conditions, including the expected relatedness in a
social group. We allow for multilocus determination of the phenotype, in the form of mod-
ifiers of the effects of the alleles at a cue locus, and we find that there can be genetic con-
flicts between modifier loci that are tightly linked versus unlinked to the cue locus.
Introduction
Traditional theories of social evolution in structured populations use reproductive value to
describe the fitness effects of variation in helping and harming traits [1–4]. They are applied to
population structures such as the two sexes [1], juveniles and adults [3], dispersers and non-dis-
persers [5], and high- and low-quality individuals [4]. Individuals can, depending on their state,
vary in their phenotype, which corresponds to a reaction norm [4], but genetic polymorphism
in social traits is not explicitly included in the theory. Although it is recognized that frequency
dependence is compatible with social evolution theory [6], questions of the emergence and
maintenance of genetic polymorphism in social traits have not been given full attention. This
absence is striking, as the possibility of such genetic polymorphism has attracted much interest.
Examples of studies in the laboratory and the field span from work on cheater-cooperator poly-
morphisms [7–15] to investigations of genetic variation in microbial pathogens [16, 17]. The
possibility that population structure contributes to polymorphism also has support [18–22].
It is already well understood that a social trait, such as an individual’s investment in helping,
can evolve to different equilibria depending on the relatedness in social groups in different hab-
itats, with more helping in habitats where there is higher relatedness. We use the concept of
genetic cues to extend this insight to situations where there is dispersal between habitats and
where the social trait is influenced by several, linked or unlinked, genetic loci. The basic idea of
genetic cues [23–26] is that alleles can function as statistical predictors of coming selective con-
ditions for an individual. As a consequence of selection, allele frequencies can differ between
local environments, such that possessing particular alleles correlates with local conditions in a
manner analogous to environmental cues. Using this insight one can integrate genetic poly-
morphism into theories of conditional phenotype determination.
If the environmental heterogeneity includes characteristics that are important for social evo-
lution, like the size or composition of social groups, the heterogeneity could favor genetic poly-
morphism in social traits. If so, there will be a correlation between gene frequencies and social
characteristics, and genes can act as cues of relatedness. To illustrate this general idea we
develop a specific model with two habitats. We show that alleles at a cue locus can provide
information about social circumstances, such as within-group relatedness and opportunities
for cooperation, and that epistatic modifiers of the phenotypic effects of a genetic polymor-
phism can evolve to make use of this information. We also show that the evolutionary interests
of epistatic modifiers can differ depending on their degree of linkage to a polymorphic locus,
and we interpret this phenomenon in terms of genetic conflict.
Model
There are two habitats, each containing a large number of groups. They are formed and dis-
solved by colonization followed by social interaction and the production of offspring that dis-
perse, and again colonization. A group in habitat i, where i = 1, 2, is founded by Ni haploid
individuals, randomly derived from a pool of dispersers in that habitat. To implement variation
between habitats in average within-group relatedness, group members reproduce asexually fol-
lowing founding, forming Ni haploid offspring group members, such that each founding group
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member has an equal and independent chance of producing each of the Ni offspring (model
details are given in S1 Text). A smaller Ni thus corresponds to higher relatedness. For a pair of
group members, the probability of being identical by descent since founding is
ri ¼
1
Ni
; ð1Þ
which follows [27] and [28]. The offspring group members engage in a social interaction, for
instance a public goods game [29], and produce dispersing offspring in proportion to the pay-
off in the game. An individual’s phenotype z represents an investment (strategy) in the game,
and we assume 0 z 1. The payoff to an individual with phenotype z in habitat i is a func-
tion wiðz; zÞ of z and the average investment z of the individual’s group. As a convenient exam-
ple we will use wiðz; zÞ ¼ Wi þ biz  ciz2, where the beneﬁt biz is proportional to the average
investment and the cost ci z
2 is assumed to increase quadratically with the individual’s invest-
ment. For polymorphic populations the group compositions will vary, and we are particularly
interested in the expected payoff in habitat i to a randomly chosen rare mutant player of the
game with phenotype z0, in a population where the resident phenotypes z1 and z2 occur with
frequencies pi1 and pi2 (where pi1 + pi2 = 1). We write this as
w0i ¼ E½wiðz0; zÞjz1; z2; pi1; pi2: ð2Þ
Because a new group is founded by random dispersers, those groups containing mutant strate-
gies will predominantly be founded by one mutant and Ni − 1 resident types. Some basic
aspects of the model are illustrated in Fig 1.
To study the invasion of mutant traits, we need the derivative of the expected mutant payoff,
which we write as
dik ¼
@ w0i
@z0

z0¼zk
¼ bi
Ni
1þ ðNi  1Þrið Þ  2cizk; ð3Þ
for habitat i and phenotype zk, i = 1, 2, k = 1, 2. We study evolutionary change of a dimorphism
z1, z2 by examining the invasion of mutant modiﬁers. Let x1 and x2 denote two alleles at the cue
locus. In the resident population, the genetic cue xk induces the phenotype zk, and nik is the
number of individuals in habitat i with phenotype zk at a population dynamical equilibrium.
The epistatic effect of a mutant modiﬁer is that xk instead induces the phenotype z0k. Letting n
0
ik
denote the (small) number of mutant modiﬁers in habitat i with phenotype z0k (i.e., linked to
cue allele xk), we can write down a population projection matrix for the mutant invasion. The
invasion ﬁtness of the mutant modiﬁer is
Fðz01; z02; z1; z2Þ ¼ log l; ð4Þ
where λ is the leading eigenvalue of the population projection matrix. Here we give an overview
of the derivation of this matrix (details are given in S1 Text).
For simplicity, we assume that individuals are haploid over most of the life cycle. However,
to explore the consequences of recombination between cue and modifier loci, we introduce sex-
ual reproduction by assuming there is a brief sexual phase in the dispersal pool in a habitat.
This involves diploid individuals and crossing over, with a recombination rate ρ between cue
and modifier loci, to produce the haploid individuals that found the groups as described above.
Mating is random with respect to the dispersal pool and occurs before the forming of groups in
the habitat. As a census point, we specify the population composition at a time after the sexual
phase, when groups have formed and the public goods game is about to start. The sequence of
events in the life cycle, starting right after the census point, is as follows: (i) public goods game
Genes as Cues of Relatedness
PLOS Computational Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005006 June 24, 2016 3 / 14
with offspring production in proportion to payoff, (ii) within- and between-habitat migration
of these offspring, forming a dispersal pool in each habitat, (iii) mating and recombination,
and (iv) the next episode of group formation, including one asexual generation. By putting
these events together, one can write down the matrix (see S1 Text). Using the population
dynamics we can also determine the region of coexistence of two phenotypes z1 and z2 for dif-
ferent sets of parameters, by determining when each phenotype can invade a monomorphism
of the other (the condition is given in equation (S16) in S1 Text).
Fig 1. Elements of the model. Panel (A) shows the population cycles in habitat 1 (color coded blue) and habitat 2
(red), including formation of social groups and playing the public goods game, resulting in the production of
dispersing offspring, some of which go to the dispersal pool in their birth habitat and some go the pool in the other
habitat. New social groups are then formed from the pool in each habitat. (B) The expected payoff Eq (2) for
mutant trait z0 in habitat 1 (blue) and habitat 2 (red) in the limit of no between-habitat dispersal. The resident traits in
habitats 1 and 2 are z1 and z2 (blue and red vertical lines). The gray curve shows mutant payoff when there is
random dispersal, with the same two resident traits. (C) Illustration of group formation for two groups in habitat 1
with N1 = 3. First founding group members are randomly drawn from the dispersal pool, followed by asexual
reproduction formingN1 offspring, each of which is a copy of a randomly selected parent in the founding group. (D)
For a rare mutant (darker blue), founding groups with mutants will predominantly contain a single mutant. The
offspring groups can contain from 0 toN1 mutants, and in expectation contain one mutant.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005006.g001
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We compute a selection gradient from the invasion fitness Eq (4) using standard methodol-
ogy of matrix population models [30]. Because we average over the group compositions Eq (2),
our analysis is consistent with the structured population approach to adaptive dynamics [31],
and it can also be seen as a direct fitness methodology for social evolution theory [1, 3], also
referred to as a personal fitness methodology [6].
In order to check our analytical results, and to illustrate the effects of genetic conflict
between cue and modifier loci, we have run individual-based evolutionary simulations corre-
sponding to our model assumptions. As a genotype-phenotype mapping in these simulations,
we used a sigmoid function
z ¼ 1
1þ exp a0  agx
  ð5Þ
of a ‘liability’ a0 + agx, where x is the effect of an allele at the genetic cue locus, and a0 and ag
are parameters that are genetically determined by modiﬁer loci (details are given in S1 Text).
To compute evolutionary equilibria numerically, we developed a C++ program that follows
a path of small steps through z1 z2–space, each of which increase the invasion fitness Eq (4),
until reaching an equilibrium. We used the Eigen C++ library [32] to compute eigenvalues. For
the individual-based evolutionary simulations, we developed C++ programs that directly
implemented the sequence of events in the life cycle, using pseudo-random numbers to handle
stochastic events, such as recombination and mutation. In the simulations, we used a total pop-
ulations size of 40 000 and time periods of 40 000 full life cycles or more.
Results
Selection gradient
We use the methodology of adaptive dynamics and matrix population modeling [30, 33] to
compute the derivative of invasion fitness for a mutant modifier. The details of the derivation
are given on pp. 8–10 of S1 Text, and here we focus on the interpretations in terms of informa-
tion in a cue. The genetic cue provides information to an individual about its current habitat.
The prior probability of being in habitat i is qi = ni/(n1 + n2), where ni = ni1 + ni2 is the number
of individuals in habitat i at a population dynamical equilibrium and nik is the number of indi-
viduals in habitat i with phenotype zk. For an allele at a modifier locus, the probability of being
in habitat i, conditional on being linked to allele xk at the cue locus is
qik ¼
pikqi
p1kq1 þ p2kq2
¼ nik
n1k þ n2k
; ð6Þ
where pik = nik/ni. The selection gradient is the derivative of invasion ﬁtness Eq (4) with respect
to mutant traits, and can be written
@F
@z0k

z0
k
¼zk
¼ V1kd1kpkq1k þ V2kd2kpkq2k: ð7Þ
To interpret this expression, note that q1k and q2k are the respective probabilities of being in
habitat 1 or 2, conditional on being linked to cue allele xk. The factor pk = (n1k + n2k)/(n1 + n2)
is a ‘dilution factor’ that appears because the mutant z0k is only expressed in individuals with
cue allele xk. The d1k and d2k are the derivatives of the expected payoff Eq (2) in habitats 1 and
2 with respect to the mutant trait, and are given in Eq (3). Finally Vik is the reproductive value
of an offspring of a player in habitat i with cue allele xk. From the manner in which the condi-
tional probability qik appears in the expression, we can conclude that the selection gradient
Genes as Cues of Relatedness
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describes changes in payoff to a ‘Bayesian decision maker at the modiﬁer locus’. Eq (7) is an
extension of the direct ﬁtness approach of social evolution theory to situations with genetic
polymorphism at the cue locus. Note that this selection gradient refers to the invasion of
mutant modiﬁers, and not to the invasion of alleles at the cue locus, except for the special case
of full linkage (ρ = 0), for which cue and modiﬁer form a unit.
Completing the life cycle, through migration, mating and recombination, and group forma-
tion, we can express Vik in terms of reproductive values vjl at our census point:
Vik ¼ v111h11km1i þ v212h21km2i þ
v121h12km1i þ v222h22km2i: ð8Þ
Here,mji is the rate of migration from habitat i to j. The ‘cue inheritance’ is described by
hjlk ¼ ð1 rÞdlk þ rpjl; ð9Þ
so that with probability 1 − ρ the cue allele is passed to offspring and with probability ρ the off-
spring receives its cue allele through recombination with a random individual in the dispersal
pool. Finally, ϕj is the probability for an individual in the dispersal pool in habitat j to become a
founding group member.
We must also examine whether or not polymorphism can be maintained at the cue locus.
This needs to be investigated as a separate question, by determining when each of the pheno-
types z1 and z2 can invade a monomorphism of the other. The condition for this is given in
equation (S16) in S1 Text.
Illustration
Fig 2 shows how the migration ratem between habitats and the recombination rate ρ between
cue and modifier loci influence dimorphic evolutionary equilibria, i.e. phenotypes where the
selection gradient Eq (7) vanishes. The blue and red curves indicate phenotypes z1 and z2 suited
to habitats with low and high relatedness. The selection gradient is illustrated in Fig 3 for a few
values ofm and ρ, and the shaded regions in this figure show where a polymorphism at the cue
locus is maintained. In this example, the only difference between habitats is the number of
founders of a social group, with N1 = 20 in habitat 1 and N2 = 2 in habitat 2, so it is appropriate
to interpret the genetic cue as a cue of relatedness.
As seen in Fig 2, there is an interaction between the migration rate and the recombination
rate, such that for very low migration rate (m = 0.01) the recombination rate has little influence
on the equilibrium dimorphism, whereas for a higher migration rate (m = 0.10) the difference
between z1 and z2 varies considerably from tight linkage to free recombination. For even higher
rates of between-habitat migration, genetic polymorphism is not maintained at the cue locus,
regardless of the cue-modifier recombination rate ρ, and the outcome is instead a mono-
morphism. For the parameter values in Fig 2, this happens form = 0.15 or higher.
Genetic conflicts
The divergence between z1 and z2 depends on ρ, as in Figs 2 and 3, because modifier alleles
with different linkage to cue alleles have different demographic futures, and thus different evo-
lutionary interests. A fully linked mutant modifier will remain more concentrated in one of the
habitats, which tends to favor specialization to that habitat, whereas an unlinked one will fairly
quickly become evenly distributed over cue alleles and habitats, which tends to favor less spe-
cialized phenotypes. This difference in evolutionary interest between modifiers follows the
logic of genetic conflicts [34], in the sense that the invasion of a loosely linked modifier,
Genes as Cues of Relatedness
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reducing the divergence between phenotypes, creates the context for the invasion of a more
tightly linked modifier that reverses this effect. The outcome of genetic conflicts can depend on
such things as the of the availability of mutations, the genetic architecture of a trait, and the
strength of selection.
For modifiers of polymorphic effects, genetic conflicts can have the further consequence of
changing selection acting on the additive effects of alleles at a locus from stabilizing to disrup-
tive, potentially giving rise to selectively maintained polymorphism at that locus. For instance,
for the case ofm = 0.10 in Fig 2, unlinked modifiers favor a very small divergence between z1
and z2, but once this outcome has been achieved, the selection on alleles at other loci with addi-
tive effects on z becomes disruptive (just as originally for the cue locus itself). Genetic polymor-
phism might then be transferred from an original cue locus to a new locus.
How this can happen is illustrated by the individual-based simulations in Fig 4. The geno-
type-phenotype mapping Eq (5) from the genetic cue x to the trait z has been changed from
that in Fig 2, where the parameter a0 was fixed, to one where both parameters a0 and ag are
genetically determined and can evolve. In Fig 4A, a0 and ag are each determined by a single
locus, either fully linked or unlinked to each other and to the cue locus. Whenm is small or
when ρ = 0, the outcome of the individual-based simulations remains in agreement with the
predictions from the selection gradient Eq (7), but form = 0.10 and ρ = 0.5, the outcome is
instead the same as that form = 0.10 and ρ = 0 (Fig 4B). The reason is that, starting with
Fig 2. Evolutionary equilibrium dimorphisms. The equilibrium dimorphisms z1 and z2, color coded blue
and red, are plotted as functions of the rate of recombination ρ between cue and modifier loci. The two
habitats differ in the size of social groups, with N1 = 20 andN2 = 2, resulting in lower relatedness in habitat 1
(r1 = 0.05) than in habitat 2 (r2 = 0.5). Three examples are shown, labeled with the rate of migration between
habitats:m12 =m21 =m = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10. The total population size is the same in both habitats, and the
parameters for the public goods game are also the same:W1 =W2 = 0.5, b1 = b2 = 3.0, c1 = c2 = 1.5. The gray
horizontal line shows the equilibrium of gradual evolution in a monomorphic population, which does not
depend onm or ρ. The dark gray points (with error bars) at ρ = 0.0 and ρ = 0.5, shifted slightly left and right for
visibility, showmean and standard deviation of the average phenotype over 10 replicate individual-based
evolutionary simulations. In these simulations, ag in Eq (5) was encoded by a single locus whereas a0 was
kept at a fixed value (see S1 Text for further explanation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005006.g002
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polymorphism at the cue locus, ag evolved to become small, reducing the divergence between
the phenotypes from Eq (5), which in turn gave rise to disruptive selection on a0, causing poly-
morphism to evolve at that locus, while the polymorphism at the original cue locus collapsed.
The end result was that the locus coding for a0 became a polymorphic cue locus, with pheno-
types z1, z2 in accordance with the evolutionary interests of fully linked modifiers of this new
polymorphism (Fig 4B). Other conceivable evolutionary outcomes of disruptive selection on a0
are shown in Fig 4C and 4D.
In Fig 4C, 5 unlinked loci have small positive effects on a0 and 5 have small negative effects,
and each of these loci became polymorphic in the simulation, while at the same time the origi-
nal genetic cue locus remained polymorphic. The overall effect was a fairly broad distribution
Fig 3. Trait evolution plots for dimorphisms. In each example, the shaded region shows where a dimorphism z1, z2
can be maintained, the arrows indicate the direction and magnitude of the selection gradient Eq (7), and the dots show
evolutionarily equilibrium dimorphisms. The examples differ in between-habitat migration ratem12 =m21 =m and rate of
recombination ρ. (A)m = 0.05, ρ = 0.001; (B)m = 0.05, ρ = 0.5; (C)m = 0.10, ρ = 0.001; (D)m = 0.10, ρ = 0.5. Other
parameters:N1 = 20 andN2 = 2,W1 =W2 = 0.5, b1 = b2 = 3.0, c1 = c2 = 1.5.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005006.g003
Genes as Cues of Relatedness
PLOS Computational Biology | DOI:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005006 June 24, 2016 8 / 14
of values for the investment z. In Fig 4D, the maximum expression at the loci with positive and
negative effects was controlled by two separate unlinked loci, and one of these became poly-
morphic, giving rise to a bimodal distribution of values of z. In these examples, a notable
amount of genetic variation in z evolved, but the width and shape of the distribution of z
depended on the details of the genetic architecture of the trait. In all cases, an individual gains
Fig 4. Results from individual-based simulations, illustrating consequences of genetic conflict. (A) Same as the
simulations in Fig 2 except that a0, in addition to ag, in Eq (5) is determined by a single locus. The blue and red points (with
error bars) show the deviating outcome form = 0.10, ρ = 0.5, which is a consequence of genetic conflict between the cue
locus and the locus encoding ag: ag became close to zero, but a0 became polymorphic, and the polymorphism at the
original cue locus collapsed. The outcome is further illustrated in (B), showing a kernel-smoothed distribution of
phenotypes in a typical simulation. The blue and red vertical lines show the prediction from Fig 3C, where ρ = 0, and the
blue and red dashed lines the prediction from Fig 3D, where ρ = 0.5. The outcome where an unlinked modifier (a0) takes
over the polymorphism depends on the genetic architecture, as illustrated in (B), (C) and (D). In (C) the modifiers a0 and ag
in Eq (5) are each determined by several loci with small additive effects, and the loci contributing to a0 all became
polymorphic. In (D) there is a more complex architecture for a0, with additive effects that in turn can be modified with an
adjustable threshold limiting the amount of gene expression, and this threshold became polymorphic (see text and S1
Text for further explanation).
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005006.g004
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information about its current habitat from its genotype, and one can show that the clearcut
polymorphism in Fig 4B is the most informative, with progressively less information on aver-
age in Fig 4C and 4D, as illustrated in Fig 5. The latter cases are intermediate between the evo-
lutionary interests of fully linked and unlinked modifiers.
Discussion
We have shown how adaptively maintained genetic polymorphism can be integrated into social
evolution theory by making use of the concept of genetic cues. The selection gradient we
derived (in eq (7)) parallels the direct, or personal, fitness approach to social evolution in class-
Fig 5. Illustration of the information contained in genetic cues. Panel (A) shows the conditional probability of being in
habitat 1 (with r1 = 0.05) for an individual possessing cue allele x1 (blue curves, q11) versus cue allele x2 (red curves, q12).
The probability is given as a function of the recombination rate ρ between cue and modifier loci. The three cases are from
Fig 2, with different rates of between-habitat migrationm12 =m21 =m = 0.01, 0.05, 0.10. The blue lines in panels (B) to
(D) show logistic regressions of habitat 1 on the liability a0+ag x in eq (5), for the individual-based simulations in Fig 4B to
4D (withm = 0.10 and ρ = 0.5). The distributions of this liability are shown in gray, and the vertical blue and red lines
indicate ‘typical’ low and high values (mean ± sd for (C) and (D)). See S1 Text for further explanation.
doi:10.1371/journal.pcbi.1005006.g005
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structured populations [3, 6], with the distinction that the presence of a cue allele in an individ-
ual’s genotype, rather than a phenotypic state, defines the class structure. In our model, indi-
viduals use strategies that are conditional on a genetic cue, but our general approach can
incorporate a combination of genetic, environmental and transgenerational cues [26, 35].
Just as is the case in standard social-evolution theory, relatedness enters into our model as a
description of the genetic structure of social groups. The structure refers to genetic variation at
epistatic modifier loci, rather than at genetic cue loci, so the relatedness parameter ri in the
pay-off derivative Eq (3) refers to rare mutants at a modifier locus. This is in accordance with
the general idea of treating genetic variation at a cue locus as input to a developmental or ‘deci-
sion-making’ system, and then to examine long-term evolution of the developmental system
[24, 26]. The value of this perspective is that it guides the analysis and interpretation by form-
ing a link to the study of conditional strategies, such as the study of phenotypic plasticity.
The different ways in which individuals gain information about themselves and their social
partners has figured importantly in the study of social evolution [2]. For instance, migrant indi-
viduals arriving in a local population have different expectations of relatedness to their neigh-
bors than non-dispersers [5]. The possibility that individuals can recognize kin through
similarity in genetically polymorphic traits has been carefully investigated, with the conclusion
that kin recognition can evolve in spatially structured populations [36–38]. Yet another possi-
bility is that individuals estimate their degree of inbreeding, and thus how likely they are to be
related to their neighbors, using their relative homozygosity as an indicator of local relatedness
[39]. Our analysis of genetic cues of relatedness contributes to this general emphasis on the
role of information, but differs from the other examples through an affinity to the study of
local adaptation in the face of gene flow, which has been given much attention in evolutionary
ecology but rather little in theories of social evolution.
We found that the genetic linkage between cue and modifier loci can influence the evolu-
tionary outcome (Figs 2 and 3), and this gives rise to genetic conflicts. Genes unlinked to a
genetic cue locus tend to favor phenotypes that are less specialized to particular habitats com-
pared to tightly linked genes, because unlinked genes become adapted to exist in all habitats, be
transferred between them, and to use the information in a genetic cue to adjust the phenotype
in an optimal way for this situation. Tightly linked genes, on the other hand, might be selected
to perform well in only one of the habitats, even at the expense of performance in another habi-
tat. The reason is that a modifier allele tightly linked to a cue locus allele can become concen-
trated to one of the habitats, with the other habitat acting as a sink, to which little adaptation
takes place [40, 41].
Our results on the role of genetic conflicts in giving rise to disruptive selection at modifier
loci (Fig 4) extends the previous understanding of genetic conflicts when there is adaptively
maintained genetic polymorphism [24]. Disruptive selection in heterogeneous environments
can maintain genetic polymorphism [42], and genetic cue polymorphism is an example of this
general phenomenon. So, if unlinked or loosely linked modifiers of a genetically polymorphic
locus evolve to reduce or eliminate the divergence between phenotypes, there will be disruptive
selection at loci with additive effects on the phenotype in question. Theoretical modeling has
found that disruptive selection tends to favor genetic architectures where polymorphism is
concentrated to a single locus [23, 43], but as we have shown, constraints on the set of geno-
type-phenotype mappings can lead to intermediate outcomes between a single-locus polymor-
phism and polygenic variation where each locus has a small effect (Fig 4).
A basic question for evolutionary theory is whether evolutionary change can be seen as opti-
mizing some form of fitness for the organism or individual [44]. Our analysis of genetic con-
flicts throws new light on this issue. It is reasonable to regard unlinked modifiers of effects at a
polymorphic locus as representing the evolutionary interest of the organism, because unlinked,
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small-effect mutant modifiers share their demographic future with the organism. Our results
in Fig 4—that disruptive selection can act to diminish the control exercised by unlinked modi-
fiers over the degree of phenotypic specialization—illustrate how individual optimization
might be circumvented when there is genetic polymorphism. Furthermore, our individual-
based simulations with multilocus genetic architectures resulted in evolutionary outcomes that
were intermediate between the evolutionary interests of linked and unlinked modifiers (Figs
4C, 4D, 5C and 5D). This fits with the general idea of the organism as a compromise between
different evolutionary interests [45, 46].
In conclusion, our framework broadens the scope of social evolution theory, by accounting
for adaptively maintained genetic variation in heterogeneous environments and by incorporat-
ing evolutionary outcomes over the range from genetic specialism to generalism. Many
instances of interactions between relatives in nature are likely to be found somewhere between
the extremes of such a spectrum. A major insight from our work is that positions along this
spectrum can correspond to the degree of genetic linkage between polymorphic loci and epi-
static modifiers of the phenotype in question. Our analysis thus delivers potentially testable
predictions about the evolution of epistasis between modifiers and polymorphic loci and can
inspire empirical investigation of the importance of genetic cues of relatedness.
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